The ‘Cold War Child’ Of Britain’s Greatest WWII Armoured Car – Hw
June 1950, fighting vehicles proving establishment. Churchy Surrey. A squat four-w wheeled machine rolls off a transport truck for its first official trials. It weighs less than 4 tons. Its armor would barely stop a rifle round. And the British army is about to bet its scout car doctrine on it.
The vehicle is a ferret. Within two decades, over 4,400 will roll off the production line. They will fight in Malaya, Aiden, Borneo, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and eventually Kuwait. They will serve with more than 30 nations across five continents. And when its replacement finally arrived, the Ferret kept deploying alongside it for nearly two more decades.
But what made this tiny scout car so successful was not some revolutionary new technology. It was the opposite. The Ferret succeeded because British engineers refused to abandon what already worked. Every critical system from the transmission to the suspension to the drive layout came directly from Britain’s greatest armored car of World War II.
The Ferret was not just inspired by the Dameler armored car. It was its direct evolutionary descendant, carrying forward engineering principles that had proven themselves from North Africa to Northwest Europe. This is the story of how wartime excellence became cold war dominance. The Dameler armored car had set an almost impossible standard when it entered service in 1941.
It became the first British armored car designed to mount a tank turret. Carrying the same 40mm two-pounder gun as the Tetrarch light tank with 52 rounds of ammunition and a coaxial bea machine gun. It could engage enemy armor rather than simply observe and report. But firepower was only part of what made the Dler exceptional.
Three innovations transformed it from adequate to outstanding. First, the Wilson pre-selector gearbox connected through a fluid flywheel. There was no clutch pedal. Drivers selected their next gear in advance, then simply pressed a pedal to engage it. This eliminated the skill barrier that made conventional armored vehicles difficult to drive under combat stress.
Second, the H drive layout placed a central differential with parallel drive shafts running to each wheel through epicyclic reduction gears in the hubs. Instead of sitting at top conventional axles, the hull dropped down between the suspension units. The result was a dramatically lower silhouette than any comparable vehicle. Third, dual driver controls at the rear meant the commander could drive backwards at full combat speed.
All five gears worked identically in reverse. When an ambush went wrong, a Dameler crew did not have to turn around. They simply drove away, facing their attackers. Combat validated every innovation. The 11th Hous took Damelers into action at Elmagne in 1942, exploiting breakthroughs to pursue retreating Axis forces.
When fitted with the Little John Squeeze bore adapter in Northwest Europe, the two-pounder could penetrate 80 mm of armor at 500 m, threatening the flanks of German tanks. Winston Churchill himself was photographed in a Dameler at Zanton, Germany in 1945. Production reached 2,694 armored cars alongside 6,626 of the smaller Dameler dingo.
The design proved so successful that it outlasted its planned replacement. The Coventry armored car was cailed at only 220 vehicles of 1700 planned, while Dameler production continued until the war’s end. By 1946, Britain recognized that the aging dingo needed replacement. The vehicle had served brilliantly, but it was cramped, underpowered, and lacked the communications equipment modern reconnaissance demanded.
In 1947, the British Army issued a formal general staff requirement for a new light reconnaissance and liaison vehicle. The specification demanded four-wheel drive configuration, a low silhouette, improved cross-country mobility, and critically a maximum width of 8 ft. This last requirement came directly from operational experience in Malaya, where counterinsurgency patrols needed vehicles that could maneuver between rubber plantation rows.
Anything wider was useless in the terrain that mattered most. The contract went to Dameler of Coventry in October 1948. It was the obvious choice. The same engineering team that had created the dingo, led by Sydney Shellard, would design its replacement using the same Radford Works facilities. The first prototype arrived at Churchy in June 1950.
Trials focused on cross-country performance, armor configuration, and suspension behavior resulting in corrections before acceptance. Production began in mid 1952. Notably, the turreted M2 reconnaissance version entered service before the open topped Mark1 liaison variant. The army wanted armed scouts immediately. Liaison vehicles could wait.
The ferret carried forward every critical dameler innovation while addressing the dingo’s limitations. The H drive layout remained the signature feature. A central differential fed parallel drive shafts to each wheel through tractor, constant velocity joints, and epicyclic reduction gears in the hubs. This configuration was essential for handling the dramatically more powerful engine without destroying the drive line.
The pre-selector 5-speed epicyclic gearbox connected through a fluid coupling with all gears available in reverse exactly as in the Dameler. A novice driver could operate the ferret effectively within hours. There was no clutch to burn, no gears to grind. The transmission forgave mistakes that would have crippled conventional vehicles.
Independent coil spring suspension using pairs of transverse links mirrored the wartime design, providing excellent cross-country mobility while maintaining the low profile that kept crews alive. What changed reflected Cold War requirements. The Rolls-Royce B60 Mark 6A engine, a 4,256 cm inline 6 producing 129 brake horsepower, nearly tripled the dingo’s power output.
The driver relocated from offset right to center position, creating a roomier hexagonal fighting compartment. Combat weight increased from approximately 3 tons to between 3.7 and 4.4 tons, depending on variant. According to crew accounts, the ferret was much noisier than the dingo. The switch from true monok to welded steel construction sacrificed some acoustic stealth for structural strength.
But what it lost in silence, it gained in versatility. The stronger hull could mount a proper turret with a 360° rotating weapon station. The MK2/3 became the most common variant, featuring an enclosed turret with a30 caliber Browning machine gun and 1,000 rounds of ammunition. Armor thickness ranged from 6 to 16 mm, sufficient to defeat shell splinters and deflect rifle caliber rounds at point blank range.
Performance specifications reflected the scout philosophy. Top road speed reached 93 kmh. range extended to 306 km from the 96 L fuel tank. The vehicle could ford just under 1 meter unprepared or 1 1/2 m with preparation. The engine ran fully submerged. Dimensions kept the ferret maneuverable in tight spaces.
Length measured 3.835 m. Width came in at 1.905 m, well under the 8t plantation row requirement. Height with turret stood at 1.879 m. Ground clearance reached 330 mm with a turning radius under 6 m. Experienced crews knew the drivetrain’s dangers. Driving above the army’s 40 mph limit could cause wind up in the transmission, potentially loosening the wheels catastrophically.
As one veteran owner warned, the wheel will continue forward while the ferret grinds to a halt and likely turns over. The speed limit was not bureaucratic caution. It was survival guidance. The ferret family eventually comprised 16 subm models across five main marks. The Mark1 series served as liaison vehicles with open tops carrying a pintal mounted bren-like machine gun with a two-man crew.
The Mark 1/1 added thicker side and rear hull plates plus a sealed hull for deep forwarding. The MK2 series with a turreted reconnaissance variants. Beyond the standard MK2/3, the MK26 added four Vicar’s vigilant anti-tankg guided missiles. This wireguided weapon could penetrate between 550 and 576 mm of armor at ranges up to 1,375 m, transforming a scout car into a tank killer.
The MarkV and 5 Big Wheel variants featured larger tires, 381 mm vacuumass assisted disc brakes, replacing the original drums, and permanently attached flotation screens for amphibious capability. The Mark 5 mounted four BAC swingfire missiles with 4,000 m range in an aluminium armored turret plus two reload missiles. What began as a liaison vehicle had evolved into a genuine anti-armour platform.
Against its Cold War rivals, the Ferret offered distinct advantages and accepted deliberate trade-offs. The Soviet BRDM2 featured full amphibious capability via waterjet propulsion, heavier armament with a 14.5mm heavy machine gun plus coaxial 7.62 62 and unique chain-driven belly wheels for crossing trenches.
But the Ferret offered a lower profile, superior mechanical reliability, and better crew protection for the gunner through its enclosed turret versus the exposed position on early BRDM variants. The French Panhard AML was directly derived from the ferret. After purchasing 200 ferrets in 1956 for successful use in Algeria, French engineers made a thorough and detailed examination of the British design before creating the AML.
The result was equally light and small, but mounted a 60 mm mortar or 90 mm gun. This reflected different doctrinal approaches. The French emphasized aggressive reconnaissance. The British emphasized observe and report. Against the American M8 Greyhound and its successors, the Ferret was half the weight at 4 tons versus 8.2 tons.
It was significantly smaller, lower, and more maneuverable with run flat tires standard. The M8 offered superior firepower with its 37 mm cannon and greater range at 563 km versus 306. But in Malayan mud and European forests, ground pressure mattered more than range. The lighter vehicle went where heavier scouts could not.
Now, before we get into the ferret’s combat record, if you are enjoying this deep dive into British engineering, consider subscribing. It takes a second and helps the channel grow. All right, let us see what happened when this vehicle met the enemy. The Malayan emergency shaped the ferret specifications and provided its first operational test.
From 1948 to 1960, British and Commonwealth forces fought communist insurgents in dense jungle and rup plantations. The 28th Commonwealth Brigade used ferrets for convoy escort along vulnerable road networks. Perimeter defense of artillery positions and counterinsurgency patrols. The 8ft width requirement paid immediate dividends.
Ferrets could maneuver between plantation rows where saladins and larger armored cars could not operate. The Mark 1/2 variant was specifically built for counterinsurgency patrols during this campaign. Featuring a fixed turret with armored roof for protection against ambush fire from elevated positions. Aiden brought the ferret into urban combat between 1963 and 1967.
The first queen’s dragoon guards and fourth royal tank regiment provided convoy escort and armored support to infantry patrols in increasingly hostile conditions. The Arab police mutiny on 20th of June 1967 tested the vehicle’s protection limits. According to regimental accounts, a ferret accompanied a Saladin to investigate an ambush site in Crater District.
The patrol came under such intense fire that paint started to flake off the armor from bullet impacts. NCO Rod Blanken became a documented ferret casualty when a sniper squeezed around through the open flap he was peering out of. The Borneo confrontation from 1962 to 1966 demonstrated what the ferret could not do.
Veterans of the fourth Royal Tank Regiment recalled that the topography was totally unsuited for any other sort of armored car activity. As movement off the road was virtually impossible, the dense jungle and limited road network confined ferrets to convoy escort and hearts and mines liaison work. They protected what they could reach, but they could not reach much.
Northern Ireland saw ferrets deployed from 1969 through the 1970s. Local residents nicknamed them Daleks due to the turret-mounted Browning, and authorities eventually deemed them too provocative for street patrols. After 1973, they operated mainly in rural areas where their presence drew less hostility.
The vehicle designed for jungle reconnaissance found urban counterinsurgency politically unsuitable regardless of its tactical capabilities. Export customers fought harder wars with their ferrets than Britain ever did. The Nigerian civil war from 1967 to 1970 provided the most documented export combat.
Time magazine reported federal forces launching attacks with English made ferret and Saladin armored vehicles toward the Berran capital of Anugu in the absence of widely distributed anti-tank weapons. The combination of firepower, protection and mobility completely outmatched footmo Bfran forces. Armored cars were battle winners in this conflict, but Bafran forces adapted.
Their Auganiguay rocket weapons eventually proved effective in knocking out Nigerian army Saladin and ferret armored cars. The Imperial War Museum holds a photograph of destroyed ferret registration N 3062 following the Abagana ambush in 1968. What worked against infantry failed against improvised anti-armour weapons. Rhodesia’s Bush War from 1964 to 1979 saw approximately 20 to 30 ferrets serve with the reformed Rhdesian armored core.
Troops nicknamed them George. Some were modified with 20 mm Hispanosa anti-aircraft guns for increased firepower. During Operation Eland on 9th August 1976, four ferrets participated in a crossber raid into Mosambique alongside Celu scouts, resulting in approximately 1,000 enemy casualties.
According to Rhdesian accounts, Cypress peacekeeping from 1964 onward produced actual combat documentation. Canadian Department of National Defense photographs show ferrets firing at Turkish positions and taking return fire during the 1964 intercomunal violence. The Royal Canadian Draons and Fort Garry Horse operated UNP painted vehicles throughout the deployment with 26 Canadian ferrets serving with UNFIC in 1965.
Operation Granby in 1991 provided the ferret’s final British deployment 40 years after production began. Four vehicles formed Ferret Force, providing close protection to the Queen’s Royal Irish Housal headquarters. The QR Museum preserves the story of Tulliard, a Mark 1 Plus crewed by warrant officer Class 1 JC Mure and Corporal Desmond Black.
Coincidentally, both men came from the same townland in County Tyrone, Ireland. During the ground offensive, Ferrets led armored columns through the brereech into Iraq under cover of darkness. When regimental headquarters came under friendly machine gun fire, the benefit of having a Mark 1 plus with the turret soon became evident.
The enclosed fighting position protected the crew while they identified and resolved the blue-on-blue incident. Tully struck two mines during the advance. An anti-personnel mine caused minimal damage. A larger mine caused somewhat more damage to a frontwheel station and tire. The ferret became momentarily airborne, but thankfully the crew were uninjured. They continued the advance.
On one occasion, two ferrets and their crews coralled 147 prisoners of war, searching and disarming them before evacuation rearwood. Vehicles designed for reconnaissance had become prisoner handlers through necessity and opportunity. The ferret served the British army from 1952 until its final Gulf War deployment in 1991.
39 years of frontline service. Replacement by the FV721 Fox began in May 1973, but only 325 Fox armored cars were built before that program ended in 1993. The Ferret nearly outlasted its own replacement. Total production reached 4,49 vehicles across 16 subm models. Export customers included nations across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
As of 2025, ferrets remain active with Cameroon, Central African Republic, Indonesia, Kenya, and ceremonially with the Royal Malaysian Police and Sri Lanka Armored Corps. Remarkably, video emerged in 2025 of a Ferret Mark1 with added drone defenses operating in Ukraine supplied through privately funded donations. A vehicle designed in the late 1940s continues serving in 21st century combat.
The Dameler armored car proved that innovative engineering could compensate for light armor and modest firepower. The Ferret proved that successful designs deserve evolution rather than replacement. Sydney Shell’s team did not chase revolutionary concepts. They refined what worked. The H drive layout, pre-selector gearbox, and independent suspension that made the Dler exceptional served equally well from Malayan plantations to Kuwaiti deserts.
When the shooting started, a ferret could still reverse at full combat speed, exactly as its ancestor had done 40 years earlier. 4,49 built, 30 nations served, 39 years of British Army service, and somewhere in Ukraine, the engineering principles that Sydney Shellard perfected in wartime Coventry are still keeping crews alive. The Ferret has become one of the most popular collector military vehicles worldwide.
Civilians can legally own and road register them in both Britain and America. Prices range from £6,000 to £9,000 for Mark 1 and MK2 variants in the United Kingdom with big wheel Markvs commanding around 15,000. Several hundred survive in private hands maintained by enthusiast organizations including the Military Vehicle Trust and the Dameler Ferret owners Group.
Museum examples preserve the combat history. The Tank Museum at Boington, the Imperial War Museum, the RAF Museum, and the QR Museum all maintain ferrets in their collections. Tully, the Gulf War veteran, remains at the QR museum with its mine damage and combat record intact. The Ferret was never the most heavily armed or thickly armored scout car of the Cold War, but it was fast, reliable, easy to maintain, and optimized for British reconnaissance doctrine.
observe, report, and survive to do it again tomorrow.
QQ4 Bob Dylan and Keith Richards have been close friends for nearly 40 years. The friendship began on a live television program in November of 1986 in the 11 seconds after Bob Dylan called Keith Richards music derivative on camera. Keith Richard’s response to that assessment, one sentence said without anger, without performance, with the specific directness of a man who has nothing to prove and knows it made Bob Dylan laugh.
Then made Bob Dylan go quiet. then made Bob Dylan say two words that people who know Bob Dylan say he almost never said to anyone. This is the story of those 11 seconds and the 40 years that followed them. The program was a live music interview special broadcast on an American network on the evening of November 3rd, 1986. The format was simple.
Two musicians, a host, an hour of conversation about music and the state of it. The producers had assembled the pairing of Bob Dylan and Keith Richards with the specific calculation of television producers who understand that two people with equally strong and potentially incompatible views about what music is and what it should do will produce better television than two people who agree about everything.
The calculation was correct, though not in the way the producers had anticipated. Bob Dylan was 45 years old in November of 1986. Bob Dylan had released Empire Burlesque the previous year and had been on the road for most of the intervening period as part of the True Confessions tour with Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers.
Bob Dylan was in November of 1986 in one of the most prolific and restless phases of a career that had consisted almost entirely of prolific and restless phases. A career that had moved through folk, rock, country, gospel, and back again, that had been declared finished at least six times by the music press, and at each time continued with the serene indifference of a river to the opinions of people standing on its banks.
Bob Dylan had been redefining what music could be. Since 1962, Bob Dylan had invented and reinvented himself so many times that reinvention had become his defining characteristic, not in the superficial sense of a performer changing costumes, but in the deeper sense of a musician who had never allowed his work to settle into a form that could be anticipated or categorized from the outside.
Bob Dylan understood influence and originality and the relationship between them better than almost anyone alive in 1986. Bob Dylan had spent 24 years thinking carefully and specifically about where music came from and where music was going and what it meant that those two things were always in constant conversation with each other.
Keith Richards was 42 years old in November of 1986. Keith Richards had been playing guitar professionally since 1962. Keith Richards had built a career on a foundation of American blues and rhythm and blues. A foundation that Keith Richards had studied with the systematic devotion of someone who understood that the tradition he was building on was not incidental to the music he was making, but essential to it.
that you could not understand what Keith Richards did without understanding where Keith Richards had come from and what Keith Richards had been listening to since he was a teenager in Dartford with American Import Records and a secondhand guitar and no teacher except the recordings themselves. Keith Richards had never pretended otherwise. Keith Richards had in fact spent considerable energy across his career making the lineage explicit, naming the artists, citing the recordings, insisting on the acknowledgement of influence that the mainstream music
industry had a long history of suppressing or ignoring or crediting to the wrong people. If anything, Keith Richards was more transparent about his sources than most musicians of his generation. Keith Richards had always said openly that the Rolling Stones came directly from the blues, that Muddy Waters and Robert Johnson and the specific tradition of the Mississippi Delta were not background influences, but foundational ones.
The music Keith Richards made was in direct and sustained conversation with that tradition, something Keith Richards considered not a limitation, but a responsibility and a form of respect. The interview had been running for 8 minutes when the host asked Bob Dylan about the current state of rock and roll.
Bob Dylan answered with the density and the indirection that characterized Bob Dylan’s responses to direct questions, turning the question over, approaching it from an unexpected angle, finding his way to what he actually thought through a series of observations that moved like a river rather than a road. Bob Dylan was not a straightforward interview subject.
Bob Dylan had been asked about rock and roll in hundreds of interviews across 24 years and had developed the habit of treating the question as an invitation to think out loud rather than a request for a prepared position. The producer Gerald Sherman said afterward that in the first 8 minutes of the interview, he had been slightly anxious, not because anything was going wrong, but because nothing was going anywhere in particular yet.
The interview had the feeling of two conversations happening simultaneously. Bob Dylan’s internal one and the external one visible to the cameras. And Gerald Sherman was not certain in those first eight minutes that the two conversations would converge into something. Bob Dylan talked about influence. Bob Dylan talked about originality.
Bob Dylan talked about the difference between music that absorbed a tradition and transformed it and music that absorbed a tradition and reproduced it. And then Bob Dylan made his assessment. And then Bob Dylan said with the precision of a man making a musical assessment rather than a personal judgment that the Rolling Stones work, and Bob Dylan was specific, naming Keith Richards as the guitarist whose approach he was discussing was derivative in a way that Bob Dylan found limiting.
Bob Dylan said it without hostility. Bob Dylan said it as a technical observation about the relationship between source material and the work that came from it. Bob Dylan said that Keith Richards played the blues the way the blues had already been played, rather than using the blues as a starting point for something that had not yet been played.
Keith Richards had been listening to this with the specific attention Keith Richards gave to things being said about music by people who knew music. Keith Richards did not interrupt. Keith Richards did not shift in his chair or display any of the visible signals of a person preparing a defensive response. Keith Richards listened to Bob Dylan’s complete observation all the way to its conclusion without interrupting and without displaying any visible signal of preparing a response.
Then Keith Richards said one sentence. The sentence was not a rebuttal. The sentence did not defend Keith Richards music or argue for its originality or challenge Bob Dylan’s characterization of what the blues meant in the context of rock and roll. The sentence was something else entirely, something that required a specific kind of confidence to say.
The confidence of a person who has spent long enough thinking about the same things as the person they are talking to that they can locate the exact point where their thinking diverges and say something useful about that point rather than simply defending their own position. The sentence acknowledged everything Bob Dylan had said, the assessment, the distinction Bob Dylan was drawing, the specific musical concern underlying the observation, and then turned it 90°.
Keith Richards took Bob Dylan’s own framework, the one Bob Dylan had used to analyze Keith Richards relationship to the blues tradition, and applied it back to Bob Dylan’s work with the same precision Bob Dylan had used to apply it to Keith Richards. Spare aimed. The sentence asked Bob Dylan something about Bob Dylan’s own music, about the relationship between Bob Dylan’s sources and Bob Dylan’s output that Bob Dylan had not been asked on television before.
The sentence did not attack. The sentence illuminated. Bob Dylan laughed. The laugh was not the polite laugh of someone responding to a joke. The laugh was the involuntary laugh of someone who has been genuinely surprised. The specific kind of surprise that a person of exceptional intelligence experiences when someone else’s intelligence exceeds their expectations.
Bob Dylan laughed for 4 seconds. Then Bob Dylan stopped laughing. Then Bob Dylan was quiet for 3 seconds in the way that Bob Dylan was quiet when Bob Dylan was thinking rather than performing thought. Then Bob Dylan said, “You’re right.” The producer in the booth, a man named Gerald Sherman, who had been working in television for 14 years, said afterward that in 14 years of live television production, he had never heard Bob Dylan say those two words in a public forum.
Gerald Sherman said he had worked with Bob Dylan on two previous occasions and had observed Bob Dylan in numerous other contexts and that you’re right was not a phrase that Bob Dylan deployed easily or often because Bob Dylan had spent 24 years being right about music in ways that other people eventually caught up with. And the experience of being right ahead of everyone else does not generally produce a man who says you’re right readily when someone else makes a point.
The host of the program, a journalist named Patricia Wells, who had been interviewing musicians for 12 years, said afterward that the 11 seconds between Bob Dylan’s assessment and Bob Dylan saying, “You’re right,” were the most extraordinary 11 seconds of television she had been present for. Patricia Wells said that what she witnessed in those 11 seconds was not a debate or a confrontation or a celebrity exchange of competing opinions.
Patricia Wells said what she witnessed was one musician recognizing another musician as an equal, which was in the specific context of Bob Dylan in 1986, not something that happened in public very often. The interview continued for another 42 minutes after those 11 seconds. The conversation between Bob Dylan and Keith Richards in the remaining 42 minutes was described by everyone who watched it as fundamentally different from the first 8 minutes.
The host, Patricia Wells, who had been conducting music interviews for 12 years and understood the difference between the performance of conversation and actual conversation, said that at approximately the 9-minute mark, something shifted in the studio. That the formal interview, architecture dissolved, and what replaced it was something less structured and more genuine.
Bob Dylan and Keith Richards talked about influence and originality and the blues and what it meant to build on a tradition without being consumed by it. They talked about specific recordings and specific musicians with the specificity of two people who had spent their entire adult lives thinking about these things and rarely found another person who had thought about them with equivalent care.
They talked about where music came from and where music was going and whether those two questions were actually one question or two. Patricia Wells said afterward that she had asked approximately four questions in the remaining 42 minutes because Bob Dylan and Keith Richards did not require questions. They required only a room and a camera and the shared understanding that what they were saying together was worth recording carefully.
She said it was the best interview she had ever conducted and that she had conducted the smallest part of it. After the program, Bob Dylan and Keith Richards were in the corridor outside the studio when the host Patricia Wells passed them. Patricia Wells said she did not stop because she did not want to interrupt.
She observed them for approximately 30 seconds from a distance. She said they were talking with the ease of people who had known each other for years rather than people who had met for the first time 2 hours earlier. She said that something had shifted between them during the broadcast that the broadcast had made permanent rather than temporary.
She continued down the corridor and did not look back. She said in her account of that evening that she had decided in that moment not to interrupt the conversation because some conversations are more valuable than any question a journalist might ask and that the conversation she had observed for 30 seconds in the corridor outside the studio was one of them.
She had been a music journalist for 12 years. She recognized the difference. Bob Dylan and Keith Richards have maintained their friendship across four decades. They have appeared together at various events, most significantly at the concert for the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1995, where people who were present described them as inseparable for most of the evening, occupying the same corner of the backstage area and talking with the concentrated attention of people who only have a limited amount of time together and intend to use it
well. Bob Dylan has spoken about Keith Richards in interviews with the specific thoughtful care that Bob Dylan reserves for musicians whose work Bob Dylan considers genuinely important rather than merely culturally prominent. Keith Richards has spoken about Bob Dylan in similar terms with the specific respect of someone who recognizes in another person a commitment to music that goes deeper than career.
Neither Bob Dylan nor Keith Richards has made a public statement specifically about how the friendship began or about the November 1986 interview. Bob Dylan has not mentioned the 11 seconds. Keith Richards has not mentioned the sentence. The interview exists in the archive. The 11 seconds are there. The laugh is there. The two words are there.
What is also there for anyone who watches the interview from its beginning and pays attention to the shift that happens at the 9-minute mark is the specific moment when two people who thought they were appearing on a television program discovered they were actually talking to each other. What Keith Richards said in that one sentence has never been officially reported.
The people who were in the studio that evening, Gerald Sherman, Patricia Wells, the floor crew, the two camera operators, the makeup artist who was watching from the side of the set, have described the sentence in consistent terms. They have described its effect. They have described Bob Dylan’s laugh and Bob Dylan’s silence and Bob Dylan’s two words.
They have not repeated the sentence itself in the specific understanding that the sentence was said between two musicians on a television program and that its power resided in the specific context of that exchange and would not survive removal from it intact. What can be said is this. Keith Richards said something to Bob Dylan about Bob Dylan’s music that used Bob Dylan’s own observation about Keith Richards as its starting point and arrived somewhere that Bob Dylan had not anticipated.
Keith Richards turned Bob Dylan’s assessment 90° and showed Bob Dylan something about the music they had both spent their lives making that Bob Dylan recognized immediately as true. And Bob Dylan said, “You’re right.” Two words said by Bob Dylan in public on live television in 1986 to Keith Richards in response to a single sentence Keith Richards had said about music.
Two words that Gerald Sherman, who had worked with Bob Dylan on two previous occasions, said he had never heard Bob Dylan say in a public forum. Two words that Patricia Wells, who had been interviewing musicians for 12 years, said were the most significant two words she had heard in those 12 years. Not because of their content, but because of who said them and what it cost to say them and what it meant that Keith Richards had produced them in 11 seconds from a conversation that began with Bob Dylan calling Keith Richards’s music derivative. And Keith Richards and
Bob Dylan have been close friends for nearly 40 years. The sentence did its work in 11 seconds on the evening of November 3rd, 1986. The work has been ongoing ever since. If this story moved you, subscribe and leave a comment below. Have you ever said something to someone that turned a potential disagreement into an unexpected and lasting connection? Tell us about it in the comments below.
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