Sam Cooke Walked Into a Room Full of Music Executives. He Left Owning His Own Label. D
In 1959, Sam Cooke sat down with a music industry lawyer and started building something that had almost never been done before. Not a record, not a tour, not a publishing deal with the standard terms that the industry offered artists who were not in a position to negotiate. He was building a record label.
His own. The music industry in 1959 was organized around a specific set of assumptions about who owned what and who decided what. The labels owned the masters. The labels owned the promotion. The labels controlled the release schedule and the marketing and the relationship with radio. And the artists occupied a position in this structure that was, in its most generous description, collaborative.
And, in its most accurate description, extractive. Artists made the music. The labels owned the music. The artists received royalties that were calculated on terms they had often signed at a point in their careers when they had no leverage to negotiate. This was the standard arrangement. It had been the standard arrangement for decades.
The black artists who had built the commercial music industry, who had created the audience, generated the revenue, developed the forms, operated within it with varying degrees of awareness of what it was costing them. The awareness, when it arrived, tended to produce bitterness or litigation or both.
What it rarely produced was a viable alternative. The alternative was hard to build. It required capital, business relationships, distribution infrastructure, and a willingness to navigate a system that did not want to be navigated around. Sam Cooke had the capital. He had the business relationships, or the beginning of them.
He had the standing that his commercial success at RCA had given him, which meant that when he appeared in rooms with the lawyers and distributors who could help him build what he was building, those rooms did not close before he arrived. He had one other thing that was less common than capital or standing. He had a clear and specific understanding of what the standard arrangement was costing him and every other artist in his position.
And he had decided not to accept it as permanent. The specific moment when Sam Cooke understood what he needed to build is not pinned to a single incident in any account. But the shape of the understanding is clear across all the accounts. It came from the experience of being a successful artist inside a system that was organized to extract value from successful artists.
And from watching other artists, artists who had come before him, artists who had generated as much or more revenue than he had, finished their careers with nothing. The extraction was not a mystery. It was the standard operation of the business. The mystery, from Cooke’s perspective, was why more artists were not trying to build their way out of it.
The answer to the mystery was access. Building your way out of the standard arrangement required access to lawyers who could structure the right contracts, to distributors who would work with an independent label, to financing that could sustain a small record company through the period before it was generating enough revenue to be self-sustaining.
These were things that most artists did not have, that the industry was not inclined to help them get, and that required a specific combination of standing and financial resources and personal relationships to acquire. Sam Cooke had that combination by 1959 in sufficient quantity to use it. He used it.
The publishing company, Kags Music, came alongside SAR Records as another component of the infrastructure Cooke was building. Publishing rights were, in the music industry of that era, the other place where value was extracted from artists who didn’t own them. The songwriter who didn’t own their publishing received a fraction of what the song earned every time it was played or covered or used commercially.
The songwriter who did own their publishing received the rest. Cooke owned his publishing. This was not common. It required understanding the publishing system well enough to structure the contracts correctly, and it required the leverage to negotiate those contracts rather than accepting the standard terms.
Cooke had both by the early 1960s, and he used them. The result was that every time “You Send Me” was played on the radio, every time “A Change Is Gonna Come” was covered or licensed or performed, the money it earned came back to the company that Sam Cooke had built, rather than to the company that had signed him.
The people who worked in the music industry in this period and who were aware of what Cooke was building described it with a combination of respect and something close to discomfort. He was doing something that the industry had organized itself to prevent, and he was doing it in plain sight, using the tools the industry had provided, which made it impossible to object to without objecting to the premise of the business itself.
The premise of the business, as Cook was practicing it, was that the person who made the music should control the music. This was not the industry’s premise. It was becoming Cook’s practice. He did not make speeches about it. He did not write essays or give interviews in which he described the exploitative history of the industry and his response to it.
He built the alternative. He signed the artists. He held the publishing. He negotiated the distribution. He created the infrastructure that the statement required, and then he let the infrastructure be the statement. The music publishing landscape that Sam Cook was navigating in the early 1960s was, by any measure, hostile to the interests of songwriters who didn’t understand it or didn’t have the professional support to negotiate within it correctly.
Publishing deals were signed routinely that transferred the rights to a songwriter’s work for terms that the songwriter would have refused had they understood what they were signing. The people who were positioned to explain what was being signed were often in the employ of the people benefiting from the signing.
The information asymmetry was structural. Sam Cook understood the structure because he had been inside it long enough to see how it worked, to trace the money from the song through the radio play, through the licensing, through the sheet music to the people who were receiving it. And to notice which of those people were not him.
Kags music was his response to that noticing. It was not a complicated response. It was the simplest possible response. Retain the rights. Hold the publishing. Put yourself in the position of the entity that receives the money rather than the entity that produces the content and then watches the money travel elsewhere.
The execution required professional help and business acumen. The underlying logic was simple enough that Cook was able to explain it to other artists in terms that they could immediately understand and act on, which is what he did. What S A R and Kags represented, among other things, was a demonstration that the alternative was possible, which made it easier for the artists in Cook’s orbit to pursue their own versions of it.
S A R Records, the name stood for Sam, Alex, and Roy, for Cook and his manager and his partner in the venture, was incorporated in 1959 and began releasing records in 1960. It was not, at the outset, a statement. It was a business. The statement was in the business’s existence, in the fact that a black entertainer in 1959 had built the infrastructure to record, produce, and release music without going through the systems that had been built to extract value from exactly that process.
The artists S A R signed were not primarily established stars. Cook was using the label to develop artists who were at the stage he had been at when he needed someone to give him a structure to work within. And to give them that structure in a form that did not extract from them the way the standard structure extracted.
Bobby Womack and the Womack brothers were signed to SAR. The Valentinos, Johnny Taylor, artists who would go on to significant careers and who received from their time at SAR something that the major labels would not have given them. A genuine stake in what they were building. The business meetings that produced SAR were not dramatic.
They were the ordinary work of incorporation and negotiation and the navigation of distribution agreements that determined whether the records you made actually reached the stores and the radio stations that your audience was using. Cook attended these meetings with the specific quality that the people who were with him described as characteristic.
Attentive, prepared, patient with detail in a way that surprised people who expected a performer to be indifferent to the mechanics of the business. He was not indifferent. He was the opposite of indifferent. He understood that the mechanics were the thing. That the business structure was where the power lived.
And that the power was the point. The music industry in 1959 had a relatively limited experience of black artists who arrived in its business offices with a clear understanding of the terms and the leverage points and the specific places where a different arrangement was possible. Cook’s arrival was, in this sense, something that the rooms he arrived in were not entirely prepared for.
He was charming and he was patient and he was completely serious. And the combination made it difficult for the people across the table to manage him the way artists were usually managed. The artists who came through SAR Records in its years of operation described something that distinguished it from their experiences with major labels.
A sense of being treated as participants rather than as product. Cook was a working musician who understood what working musicians needed from a label relationship. Not just the advance and the recording budget and the promotional push, but the sense that the people running the label had some genuine investment in what you were trying to do.
That they had listened to the music and had an opinion about it that went beyond its commercial potential. He ran SAR that way. Not perfectly. He was learning the label business at the same time he was running it. But with a seriousness about the artists and the music that the artists consistently identified as different from what the industry normally provided.
The business decisions Cook made at SAR were not always correct. He was 28 years old and building something that required expertise he had acquired by living in the industry rather than by being trained in business administration. He made the mistakes that people make when they are learning something complicated in real time.
But the underlying architecture of what he was building, the artist-owned label, the controlled publishing, the retention of masters, was sound. It was sound in 1959, and it is sound today. Which is why the model he was building has been the model that every subsequent generation of artist with sufficient leverage has tried to replicate.
Sam Cooke was killed in December 1964. SAR Records continued for a short time after his death and then closed. The infrastructure he had built did not survive him in the form he had built it. The specific combination of his standing and his business acumen and his relationships was not replicable without him.
But what he had demonstrated was replicable. The model. The artist who builds the label, controls the publishing, owns the masters, and uses the music business’s own tools to operate outside the terms the music business wants to impose, is the model that defines the most successful artists of the decades that followed.
The names that are cited when people discuss artist ownership and control in the contemporary music industry, the names of the artists who have built their own infrastructure, who own their masters, who have used their leverage to negotiate terms that their predecessors couldn’t, exist in a lineage that runs through Sam Cooke in 1959.
The move was not invented in the 1990s. It was not invented in the streaming era. It was invented in 1959 in Los Angeles by a man who had been extractively managed for long enough to understand exactly where the extraction was happening and who had decided to build something different. Bobby Womack, who was inside the SAR operation and watched it from close range, described it in later interviews as an education that no music school could have provided.
Not in the music. He had learned the music from Cooke in a different register, but in the business. in the understanding that the music and the business were not separate things and that the person who treated them as separate was the person who was going to lose the business half while keeping the music half which was the half that didn’t pay.
Sam Cooke walked into a room full of music executives in 1959 and presented himself not as a client but as a business. The room had to adjust. The adjustment took a while and what came out of it SAR Records CAGS Music the infrastructure of an independent creative economy built by one of the most commercially successful artists in the country was not what the room had expected to produce.
He was 28 years old when he started building it. He had 5 years. In 5 years he built something that demonstrated a possibility that the music industry had organized itself to prevent and that artists have been pursuing in one form or another ever since. The business he built did not outlast him. The idea he built it around did.
That is what it means to do something first. Not to be the only one who does it but to demonstrate that it can be done. To take the possibility from theoretical to actual in a way that everyone who comes after can see and learn from and build on. Sam Cooke built SAR Records and proved that it was possible.
Everything since has been built on that proof.